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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-4734 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT STINSON, JR., 
       Appellant 
__________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2:10-cr-00724-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 1, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 16, 2014) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 Appellant Robert Stinson, Jr. appeals the 324-month prison sentence imposed after 
this Court vacated his initial 400-month prison term.  See United States v. Stinson, 734 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2013).  Stinson claims that the District Court erred procedurally by 
rejecting his forensic psychologist’s conclusions upon which his mitigation arguments 
rested.  Discerning no error in the District Court’s consideration of the psychologist’s 
opinions, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
I.  
 From 2006 through 2010, Stinson solicited over $17 million from hundreds of 
individuals for a sham investment fund called “Life’s Good.”  On August 15, 2011, 
Stinson pleaded guilty to five counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; four 
counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; nine counts of money laundering, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957; one count of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1344; three counts of filing false tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206; two counts 
of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505; and two counts of making false 
statements to the federal government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 
 The District Court sentenced Stinson to 400 months’ imprisonment, a sentence 
that was approximately 10% above the advisory guidelines range of 292 to 365 months.  
On appeal, we concluded that the District Court had erred in applying a two-level 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) for deriving $1 million or more from a 
financial institution.  Stinson, 734 F.3d at 181.  On remand, the District Court re-
calculated the advisory guidelines range to be 235 to 293 months, a range that Stinson 
does not contest.  The District Court again varied upward by approximately 10%, 
imposing a prison term of 324 months.  Stinson timely appealed. 
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II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
III.  
 Stinson’s sole argument on appeal is that the District Court committed procedural 
error by rejecting the testimony of defense witness Dr. Catherine Barber.  Prior to 
sentencing, Dr. Barber  conducted a three-hour interview with Stinson, administered 
psychological tests, read the Presentence Investigation Report (including victim impact 
statements), and reviewed the indictment.  Based on this information, she issued a report 
and testified at the initial sentencing hearing that Stinson met the criteria for narcissistic 
personality disorder. 
 Consistent with this diagnosis, defense counsel argued that Stinson’s grandiose 
and unreasonable estimation of his own capabilities led him to believe that his business 
activities would prove wildly successful and generate huge returns for investors.  Arguing 
that “this is not a case in which [the defendant] stole in a cold-blooded manner[,]” (App. 
207), and that Stinson’s narcissistic personality disorder is amenable to psychological 
treatment, the defense requested a sentence below the advisory guidelines minimum of 
235 months.   
 The District Court was not swayed by this argument.  Recognizing that the 
requested downward variance rested upon Dr. Barber’s conclusions, the District Court 
stated:  
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. . . I first want to say that I reread Dr. Barber’s report, and I 
give low weight to her opinions.  I don’t dispute her expertise 
or her knowledge, but she relies very heavily on what Mr. 
Stinson told her . . . and I don’t think he’s a reliable person in 
any way, shape, or form by virtue of the extensive fraud that 
he committed on so many victims here . . . . 
 
(App. 215.)   
 Stinson asserts that the District Court’s statement reveals a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the bases for Dr. Barber’s conclusions.  Far from relying on what he 
had told her, asserts Stinson, Dr. Barber actually relied upon victim statements in the 
Presentence Investigation Report to form her opinion that “Stinson was a ‘perfect fit’ for 
the criteria of a narcissistic personality disorder.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 20.)  According 
to Stinson, Dr. Barber quoted statements Stinson made, not for their truth, “but to 
illustrate his exaggerated sense of his talents and capacities.”  (Id.) 
 The point made by the District Court, however, is that Dr. Barber necessarily had 
to rely upon what Stinson told her, not for the truth of what he said, but for the purpose of 
making her diagnosis, and Stinson wanted to use that diagnosis to reduce his punishment.  
The District Court took into account Stinson’s success as a con artist, bilking investors of 
more than $17 million and even deceiving a well-regarded investment-rating agency, 
Morningstar, Inc., in deciding to accord little weight to Dr. Barber’s opinion. 
 Where, as here, the defendant asserts that an incorrect factual determination 
resulted in a procedural error in imposing the sentence, we apply the “clear error” 
standard of review.  See United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 119 (2014).  Under 
the clear-error standard, it is our responsibility “to accept the ultimate factual 
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determination of the fact-finder unless that determination either (1) is completely devoid 
of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no 
rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.”  DiFederico v. Rolm Co., 201 
F.3d 200, 208 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 We cannot say that the District Court clearly erred in finding that Dr. Barber relied 
heavily on Stinson’s statements in arriving at her conclusions.  Indeed, her conclusions 
necessarily depended upon Stinson’s own statements regarding his personality and 
mindset.  She interviewed only Stinson.  The District Court had before it a record of 
sophisticated deceptive conduct by Stinson that continued even after his arrest on the 
underlying charges.  The record supported a rational conclusion that Stinson was an 
inveterate manipulator, thereby justifying the District Court’s decision to discount any of 
Dr. Barber’s conclusions that depended on Stinson’s statements.  
 Because the District Court did not err in according little weight to Dr. Barber’s 
opinions, there is no need to speculate about how the District Court might have 
considered Stinson’s mitigation arguments that rested on Dr. Barber’s conclusions.1  It is 
sufficient to observe that there was ample support for the sentence imposed in this case.  
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
1
 Stinson does not challenge the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. 
